FPA New Income Fund (the “Fund”) returned 0.36% in the second quarter of 2026.

Although certain individual bonds detracted from performance during the quarter, there were no other meaningful detractors at the sector level.

Below is a summary of our investment activity during the quarter, in which we:

  • Extended the duration of our existing Treasury holdings
  • Sold asset-backed securities (“ABS”) with a weighted average life and duration of 1.9 years and 1.6 years, respectively.
  • Bought 5-year maturity Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (“TIPS”)
  • Bought High Quality bonds with a weighted average life and duration of 4.7 years and 4.2 years, respectively, including:
    • Treasuries
    • ABS backed by equipment

We did not make any Credit investments during the quarter.

As noted above, we initiated a new position in five-year maturity TIPS during the quarter. Like a typical Treasury bond which is known as a nominal Treasury (“Treasury”), TIPS are backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government. Treasuries pay a fixed rate of interest on a fixed principal balance. TIPS also pay a fixed rate of interest but on a principal balance that grows at the rate of inflation (or shrinks at the rate of deflation). The yield on a Treasury (referred to as the nominal yield) can simplistically be broken down into two pieces – a real yield over the life of the Treasury plus the expected inflation over the life of the Treasury. In other words, when buying a Treasury, one is buying a fixed real yield and fixed amount of inflation. To the extent that real yields and/or expected inflation change during the five-year life of a Treasury, the nominal yield and thus the dollar price of the Treasury will change. On the other hand, the real yield of TIPS is fixed and the inflation component of the TIPS future return will “float” based on actual inflation over time. As a result, the dollar price of TIPS will respond to changes in real yield.

Looking backward, actual inflation over a five-year period can differ from the inflation that was expected at the beginning of the five-year period. Over the life of a Treasury, if actual inflation is higher than the inflation expected at the time of the Treasury investment, then the total real return over the life of the Treasury will be less than the real yield at purchase. In comparison, over the five-year life of the TIPS, the realized real return should be similar to the real yield at purchase, regardless of actual inflation over those five years. It stands to reason then that one might want to buy TIPS if one has a view that actual inflation will be higher than the expected inflation that is embedded in the yield of the Treasury. As an example, at June 30, the nominal yield on the 5-year nominal Treasury was 4.23%. The real yield on the 5-year TIPS was 1.95%. The implied inflation expected over the next five years was 4.23% less 1.95%, or 2.28%. If one had a view that inflation over the next five years would be greater than 2.28%, it may make sense to buy TIPS instead of Treasuries and vice versa.

So what is our view on inflation? It should surprise no one that we do not have a view on inflation. We have written many times before that macroeconomic and market predictions do not drive our investing process because we believe investing in that manner is a low conviction way to produce attractive long-term risk-adjusted returns. How then did we choose to buy TIPS? It’s quite simple: at our purchase prices, we found that TIPS offered an attractive absolute return over a range of real interest rate and inflation scenarios in the short (12 months) and long (5 years) term. In the short-term, TIPS may produce an attractive positive absolute return while underperforming a Treasury in some scenarios (think very low inflation and very low real interest rates) but may alternatively produce an attractive positive return and outperform a Treasury in other scenarios (think elevated inflation and rising real interest rates). Further, consistent with our investment process, even when assuming very low inflation, we believe we purchased TIPS at prices that would produce at least a breakeven return over twelve months if real interest rates were to increase by 100 bps during that time. In short, much like our prior investments in Treasuries and our investments in any other type of debt, when considering what could happen in the future, we believe the TIPS offered an attractive upside-versus-downside and attractive long-term return without taking a view on what will happen in the future.

Spread measures the compensation debt investors receive for an uncertain return profile. Treasuries are considered the “risk-free” asset because the market views it as a certainty (or near certainty) that Treasuries will be repaid in full at maturity with no possibility of prepayment, extension of payment or haircut to the amount owed (at least in nominal terms). In comparison, almost everything else with a similar expected maturity bears a higher yield than Treasuries because other types of debt may possibly be repaid early, late, or not at all. That difference in yield versus Treasuries is the spread.

A big driver of whether and when debt is repaid (in addition to call or extension features) is the credit quality of the borrower. Viewed through that lens, spread can be seen as the compensation that debt investors receive for taking on credit risk – the risk that a borrower will not repay debt in full and/or by maturity. Over the past few months, spreads have decreased into historically low territory. In other words, the compensation for credit risk has decreased into historically low territory.

When faced with an unattractive price, we look elsewhere until we find an attractive price. To help understand our direction of travel, conceptually we can think about our investment process as follows: we typically will look first for attractive Credit and High Quality investments. If we cannot find attractive investments, we typically hold cash. Thus, cash is the residual of our investment process. We have said in the past that our cash balance is a reflection of the opportunity set. A lower cash balance reflects what we believe is an attractive investing environment and a higher cash balance reflects an unattractive environment. There can be at times, however, a stop on the way to cash: Treasuries.

Alternatively, the yellow bars on the chart above indicate the short-term upside return potential over twelve months if rates decrease by 100 bps. In the example above, the 5-year Treasury offered a potential 12-month total return of 7.95%. We find the combination of a 4.23% base case return, a potential 0.66% downside return and a potential 7.95% upside return compelling. Importantly, we are downside focused first. As such, we would not find this return profile attractive were it not for the ability to expect at least a breakeven return in a rising interest rate environment – this is the premise behind our 100 bps duration test.

The duration analysis above explains the Fund’s Treasury exposure. Like cash, the Treasury exposure is a reflection of the dearth of more attractive opportunities. Unlike cash, Treasuries avoid some of the opportunity cost of cash if interest rates decline.

Putting everything together, as we evaluate individual investment opportunities, low spreads cause us to choose lower credit risk investments instead of higher credit risk investments – even within the investment grade universe – and high risk-free rates cause us to choose longer duration investments instead of shorter duration investments. To be clear, we are not categorically waving off everything with a high yield rating or that sits within the lower quality tiers of the investment grade universe. We make our decisions at the individual investment level. Repeating those decisions has led us to low Credit exposure and a relatively longer duration at the portfolio level. Some may not find this positioning exciting. We do. We are excited about not owning a portfolio laden with overpriced credit risk. We are excited about the ability to capture a lot of the return of the bond market in a falling interest rate environment but with some ability to mitigate drawdowns in a rising interest rate environment.

There is much to celebrate this July, America’s 250th birthday. Please forgive us for focusing on the negatives. As bond investors, we are typically not paid to do otherwise. We recognize that other fixed income managers’ greater credit exposure may allow them to make more money than we do in the short-term (and we emphasize “we” because we are also investors in the Fund). However, we also recognize that spreads are very low and we would not want to jeopardize your capital and ours by taking on uncompensated risk. Though we are ready to change our positioning if and when the market gets cheaper, we further recognize that the market for credit risk can remain expensive for a long time. We believe that patience in waiting for more attractive opportunities will be rewarded in the long-term. In a nod to the World Cup, we feel like we are in the 90th minute of the match but there may be stoppage time and perhaps extra time6. If this current episode is anything like past episodes of market exuberance, then just like a World Cup match, it will end at some point although it’s not clear exactly when. Until then, we will be like those teams that play defense the entire game –boring to watch but exciting once they find an opportunity to strike.